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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBYN MICHELLE HOGGAN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
District Court No.070902181

vs.
RANEE BOLEY FLEMING aka RENEE
B. FLEMING, KAREN B. GAMONAL
aka KAREN HALTERMAN, JOYCE H.
CROCKETT, JOHN D. HOGGAN, LEO
V. JOLLEY, ROSALEE J. KEELE aka
ROSALEE M. HASLAM, THE
ESTATE OF KRISTE H. STREET, THE
ESTATE OF ELIZABETH D. JOLLEY
GARDNER aka ELIZABETH DUNCAN
JOLLEY, aka ELIZABETH DUNCAN,
and JOHN DOES 1-100,

Appellate No. 20090399

Defendants/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I.

ELIZABETH GARDNER DID INTEND TO CONVEY AN INTEREST IN
THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE.
Defendants argue that the testimony of Plaintiff and other evidence establishes that

Elizabeth Gardner did not intend to provide a present interest in the real property at issue
in this matter. However, Defendants presume too much from the testimony and evidence.
Clearly Elizabeth Gardner did not intend to convey the entire real property, as she left
herself on the deed with Defendant John Hoggan as joint tenants. See Addendum "A".
The fact that an interest was intended to be conveyed to Defendant John Hoggan is
1
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obvious though and undeniable from the 1991 deed itself and the loan documents. See
Addendums "A" and "B". Further, in order to get the loan, the property interest had to be
conveyed. See Tr. at 34:6-12 and Addendums "A" and "B". Again, the documentary
evidence is clear that there was intent to transfer a present interest in the real property,
specifically, the 1991 deed and loan documents. See Addendums, "A" and "B".
Defendants also argue that the will shows that an interest was not intended to be
conveyed. The will has no effect on the deed recorded on October 23, 1991. The Utah
Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in the case Matter of Estate ofAshton v.
Ashton, 898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In that case, the decedent and his surviving
spouse owned some real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship. See Id. at
825. The trial court was reversed on appeal for including this property as part of the
estate and not as a non-probate asset that passed according the deed. See Id. at 826. The
Court of Appeals stated "[w]hen title to property is held in joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, a rebuttable presumption arises that the title holders intended to create a
valid joint tenancy." Id. A party challenging this presumption must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent did not intend to create a joint tenancy. See Id.
Finally, in that case, the trial court had erred by focusing on the decedent's intent when
he created his will because the decedent's "intent when he executed his will does not rise
to the level of clear and convincing evidence that he did not intend to create the joint
tenancies." Id. Similarly here, the will does not rise to the level of clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent did not intend to create the joint tenancy.
2
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Lastly, Defendants discuss Plaintiffs testimony, As has already been discussed in
Plaintiffs initial brief, Plaintiffs testimony was not as conclusive on that point as
Defendants have portrayed. Therefore, those arguments should be ignored.
II.

PLAINTIFF HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to adequately marshal the evidence.

This conclusion is simply incorrect. The evidence that Defendants point to is irrelevant
and not dispositive of intent. For example, consider the argument that Plaintiff failed to
marshal the fact that Elizabeth did not have counsel at the time she executed the 1991
quit claim deed. See Defendants' Brief at pg. 13. Whether she had counsel or not has no
bearing on her intent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that the decision of the trial court to
grant the motion to dismiss be reversed.
DATED this

ffi^l

day of March 2010.

A

jgW

% 3S3C
$a|fc|uelM. Bajrkk
Jeffi-ey A. Calliper
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

u

l

day of March 2010,1 caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed in the
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, to the following:
Thomas Christensen, Jr.
Brett N. Anderson
BLACKBURN & STOLL
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
Ranee Boley Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming,
Karen B. Gamonal aka Karen Halterman,
Joyce EL Crockett, Leo V. Jolley,
Rosalee J. Keele aka Rosalee M, Haslam,
Estate of Kriste H. Street,
Estate of Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner aka
Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan
Matthew N. Olsen
OLSEN&OLSEN
8142 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee John D. Hoggan

Secretary
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED
ELIZABETH D JOLLEY AKA ELIZABETH D OOLLEY GARDNER

of
SALT LAKE CITY
QUIT-CLAIM t o

-of

, C o u n t y of

grantor
, State of Ucab, hereby

SALT LAKE

ELIZABETH D OOLLEY AKA ELIZABETH D OOLLEY GARDNER and JOHN D IIOGGAN, a
married m a n i a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , but not as tenants in commoni with f u l l
r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p
grantee
SALT LAKE CITY,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,
STATE OF UTAH
for the sum of
OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION AND TEN AND N O / 1 0 0 — D O L L A R S ,

the following described trace

of land i n

SALT LAKE

State of Utah:

•'

COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 1, CLOCK 5 3 , PLAT " Q " ,
SALT LAKE CITY, SURVEY. AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 41-5 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 7 RODS; THENCE EAST 41-5 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 7 RCDS'TO THE
PLACE OF BEGINNING.

m

K

ra
the band o£ said grantor , this
^ 22nd
OCTOBER
, A . D t one thousand nine hundred and

day of

WITNESS

Signed In the presence of

STATE OB UTAH,
County of

SALT LAKE

gj

Elizabeth Q'Jolley aka''Gliznbeth</0 Jol'foy
Gardner
^v^t-

}-

day of
OCTOBER
On the
22nd
personally appeared before me
thousand nine hundred md
91
Elizabeth D Jolley aka Elizabeth .0 Jolley Gardner
the signer of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledge t o m c chat s be
execur
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51^^632

OCTOBER U

K A T X E L~

UJ«

Art

DIXON

RECORDER* SALT LAKE COUNTY* UTAH
FIRST AKERICAH TITLE
REC BY5 REBECCA GRAY
» DEPUTY

da

) I

«

en
co
en
ca
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A F C U #238 12/9D

AMERICA
CREDIT

HOME
AGREEMENT, NOTE AN
>r's N a m e & Address;

327223-4.

Accounl #

ftTEMENT

Date . 10/22/91

t

ELIZABETH D GARDNER

JOHN D H06GAN a n d ROBY

ft
6 8 7 EAST 3RD AVENUE,

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103
.5.5
T^T
9.3

Index (See Section 14):
it Above Index;
•nding A N N U A L P E R C E N T A G E R A T E ;

J/o

Current Daily Periodic Rate:

J/o

Credll Limit',..

Jrf>.

Las! Advance Dale; •

.02548 ^
25,000.00
10/22/2001

your Amarjoa First Home Equity Line Revolving Credit Agreement, Note, and Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Slalsmenl ("Agreement"), It s p e l l s out the
j conditions ol your variable rate revolving credit plan ("Account") with America Fksi, as disclosed abovejin this Agreement, the words " y o u " a n d '^ojjt."
^nd/al?7pBrsons whojsjg^lhisAgreemenj, and all persons who use the account, each a n d all of whom will b e b o u n d to the terms and aondlllons of
anient. 7he~words ,'>wyfrusfTrnour'')
and "Credit Union" mean America Plrst Credit Union, Creditor.
* P r o m i s e to L e n d Money, Opoe thls.Agreement is executed, we agree to establish your Account with the ,Qredlt Limit shown ab.ove. We a g r e e to make
so long a s the terms of this conlracl are .being met,,.
.
, .
v to.Use Your A c c o u n t . You can obtain advances by any metbod"(s) the Credit Union authorizes,from ll fcn8 tqt/rne. \i authorized you.can write a H o m e
e check by using the.special numbered checks that we will supply to you; or you can arrange tor the transfer of funds from your Account into your
ecking account,. T h e full amount paid'b'y us on each Home Equity Line check or transfer will be added to the outstanding principal b a l a n c e .of your
s ol 1he date of payment or transfer. We ar.e n.ol obligated to accept your H o m e Equity. Line checks in payment of amounts that are d u e under your
fmore than one person .can obtain loan advances under this Agreement, we will pay Home Equity Line checks or honor Account.transfer requests
.ny of you, bul If you make conflicting demands on us, 'we, at our option,, may choose not to pay any Home Equity Line oheck or honor a n y Aocounf
:juast. You agree to abide by any applicable terms, and agreements In effect if you .use Loan Checks, a VISA D e b i t Card, ^Automated Teller M a c h i n e s ,
or other methods authorized by the Credit Union from time to time to access your account, No minimum a d v a n c e amount is required.
Promise to Pay, The payments under this plan will vary according to your balance, T h e payment amount d u e is computed at 1.25% o f the unpaid
dance owing on the first day of eaoh month,.or $60 .which ever'ls greater. Payments are due andpayable by the 2.0th of each month. T h e first payment
ie 20th day of.tbe month following ihe creation of your Home Equity Line. T h e payment compulation formula m a y be Increased m increments of .25%
o to prevent negative amortization of your principal balance, You will be given advance notice of any required c h a n g e s in the payment computation
u promise to pay all loan advances extended, to you or to any pther person authorized to use your Account, a l o n g With all finance c h a r g e s and a n y
and charges according to this Agreement, All payments" must be made in U,S, dollars.
" '
. . . . . .
Advance Date; Pinal Payment.Date.' The last advance date shown )s the last date that loan advances can be obtained on. this a c c o u n l , u n l e s s future
•e cancelled earlier as provided in this Agreement. T h e final payment date may be many years after the last advance date, d e p e n d i n g o n whether
ay more than the required payment. The final payment date is a function of the amount advanced, the Interest rales, a n d IhB payment computation
effect over the duration of the loan. If you desire to pay the balance off by the last advance datB, you must discontinue additional a d v a n c e s , a n d
? payment amounts greater than that required under the plan. Your payments must b e sufficiently large to liquidate ihe outstanding b a l a n c e plus
rest. You realize'f hat If during the term of your Home Equity Line Loan you make only the required payments, a n d do not make additional repayments
hat thB total amount outstanding at Ihe last advanoe date may be significantly larger, than any previous balance. Y o u agree to continue making payments
red during the draw period or greater, throughout the repayment period until the entire unpaid balance plus a c c r u e d interest has been p a i d fn full,
>f the repayment period will depend on the .balance owed at the e n d of the draw period.
Person Liable. $ l f more than one person has signed or is otherwise bound by the terms of this Agreement, then each will bB jointly a n d severally

entire amount due under this Agreement.

.

.

. . •

...

'

(

"""""*

\

^—:

^.

iy, $ This Agreement is secured by a Deed of Trust ("Security Instrument") upon property (The "CollaleraH.^vhich you ownyand jnow occupy/and
to occupy as vourPliftcipaI residence, Which property is located at
b o / h A o I 6RU AvhHUba
SAL I L A K E C I T Y , UTAH 84103.
, , _;
_„ • .
The Security Instrument secures ail future amounts under
it up to and including the full amount of your Credit Limit, The Collateral, and ourrightswith respect to Jt„ are more fully described in the. Security Instrument,
y Insurance, Property Insurance Is required by us against loss or damage to the Collateral.' Fire insurance coverage for all structures Is required
equal to the total available limits of all loans (regardless of lender) for which a security interest in the Collateral Is outstanding, You must obtain
such required insurance at your cost and expense in full force until the unpaid balance of your Account is paid In full and this Agreement is tari.insurance may also be required by us against flood damage If the Collateral is in a flood danger area. If required, you are responsible for obtaining
ig It. You may obtain property, fire and flood Insurance from anyone you want who Is acceptable to us. Jf'you fail to provide insurance as required
nenl, the Credit Union can add.the cost of insurance lo proleol Us security interest.
•
.
idlt Limit. Your Credit Limit Is set forth above. We are not obligated to honor any Home Equity Line check or Account transfer request that would
3ipaf balance of your Account to exceed the amount of your Credit Limit. We may elect lo advance, however, the full amount of such Home Equity
\ccounl transfer and treat such advance as a loan advance under this Agreement without thereby increasing your Credit Limit. You agree to repay
>on demand any such advance; together with any applicable Finance Charge.
'
• t.
In Your Credit Limit. Your credit limlfis set al a particular amount. N e w loan documentation must be s i g n e d and a three-day rescission period
any funds above the original limit can be advanced.
;
•
ent, You may pay early a n d you may pay extra or larger payments without any penalty. However, any larger o r additional payments will not relieve
)bllgatlon to make ihe next succeeding minimum.monthly payment when due.
Statements. Each month in which there is an outstanding balance on your A c c o u n l , you will receive a monthly statement from us, T h e statement
} other things, your " N e w Balance/' the minimum amount you must pay, w h e n you must pay it, your current periodic rale, a n d your A n n u a l PercenigrBe to pay us the minimum payment due on or before the due date s h o w n o n your statement, The " N e w B a l a n c e " jncludes the outstanding
e and other costs and charges according-1o this Agreement.
Changes o n Daily B a l a n c e . The finance charge is the cost you pay for credll. T h e annual percentage rale does not include costs other than
ince charge on each new advance begins on the dale of the advance and continues until the advance has b e e n repaid In full. T h e finance charge
i g the "daily balance" method. To compute the finance charge, the unpaid balance for each day since your last payment (of since a n advance
3( made a payment) is multiplied by the applicable daily periodic rale. T h e s u m of these amounts ts the f i n a n c e charge listed. T h e balance used
inance charge is the balance on your account each day after payments a n d credits have been subtracted and new a d v a n c e s a n d other debits '
I. Any unpaid finance charges are excluded in calculating the balance, T h e r e Is no " f r e e period" within w h i c h payments may be m a d e In order
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
)id Finance Charges,
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Charge. You will pay a lale fee on payments 16 dk, jr more delinquenl.The lale (ee charged will be 4% of tbi.
nlhly payment or a $4.00 minimum
ie maximum tee charged will nol exceed $15.00. "
'
able Interest Rate. The line has a variable rate fealure. The annual percanlage rale (corresponding lo-the periodic rale) and the minimum monthly
an change. The annual percentage rale Includes only Interest and not other costs. The Inlerost rale for variable rate advances is based on the New
al Reserve Discount Rale plus a margin. The index is determined quarterly by averaging the New YorK Federal Reserve Discount RatB on the third
eaoh month in the preceding quarter and rounding )i up to the next ,5%, the interest rate on existing balances will be adjusted on the first day of
DtW, July and Oolobar. The maximum interest rate will not exoeed 2T% In the event' that the maximum rate of 21% is reached, we have the right 1o
r limit or \o freeze your limit and prohibit any further advances, However, onoe the rale drops below the cap of 21%, your limit Will be reinstated. The
"Annual Percentage Bate" shown on the reverse side of this agreement Is the rale In effect on the dale of this agreement. This initial base rate may
each quarter according to the movement of the Federal Reserve Discount.Rale, An Increase or decrease in the index will Increase or decrease your
arge and may affect the minimum payment amount,
• Charges. Our annual maintenance fee Is $50.00. We are currently waiving this lee. However, we have the right to charge this fee or a portion of
e in the future, We also reserve the right to charge fees for stop payments and returned ohecks,
ilar Payments We oan accept and deposit iate payments or partial payments, or drafts, checks or money orders marked "payment In full" without
if our rights under this Agreement.
H. We can terminate your line, require you lo pay us the entire outstanding balance in one payment, and charge you certain fees If;
engage in fraud or material misrepresentation In connection with the line,
do not meet the repayment terms,
- action or Inaction adversely affects the collateral or our rights in the collateral,
ng Your Limit. We can refuse to make additional extensions of credit or reduce your credit limit if:
value of the dwelling securing the line declines.significantly below lis appraised value for purposes of the line,
reasonably believe you will not be able lo meet [he repayment requirements due lo a material change in your financial clrcumstanoes,
are In default of a material obligation in the agreement.' '
3rnment aollon prevents us from Imposing the annual percentage rate provided for or impairs our security interest such that the value of the interest
5S than 120 percent oi the credit line,
julalory agency has notified us that continued advances would constitute an unsafe and unsound practice,
maximum annual percentage'rale Is reached.
atlon oi Your Account. If an event ol termination ocours and we simultaneously or later declare in writing said event to be a default under this
lis Agreement shall terminate and amounts owing to' us shall become due and payable In full. We may refuse to declare a particular event to be
aive our right to do so, but our refusal to declare an 'event to be a default or waiver of ourrlght to do so does not bind us if a similar or different
later. At that time, we have the right lo decide whether to declare that event to be a default. Our obligation lo make advances will stop at the time
Men declaration of default even if we have not notified you of thai declaration prior to that time. If we declare a default, ail sums due and owing
count are due and payable, Upon default, you cannot use your Account and the default could result in the loss of your home, which Is the Collateral
ment, and/or Judgment against you.
ition of Your Account by You. You may terminate your Account at any time by sending written notice to us and returning any outstanding Home
ecks in your possession. The termination will be effective as soon as we can reasonably act to stop new advances from being made on your Account,
rfll not t>e obligated to honor all Home Equity Line checks received by us before the termination becomes effective, in addition, we have the right
iquired) to honor after termination all Home Equity Line checks dated before the termination becomes effective,
oi Equity Line Checks and VISA Debit Card, If your Account is terminated you agree to immediately return lo us any Home Equity Line checks,
(" cards which we have previously provided to you, These items remain "our property even In your possession,
Irror Notice. See the attached statement for Importa'nl information regarding your right to dispute, a billing error.
ilc Fund Transfers. Telephone requests for advances, or transfers on your Account maybe limited as required by the "Electronic Fund Transfers
iposed upon us by Jaw, This regulation may also be applied to requests made through the "Acceasline" audio response system.
:>n Costs - Foreclosure, If this Agreement and/or the Security Instrument is referred to an attorney (or collection, you agree to pay reasonable
nd costs, whether or not a lawsuit is filed, and attorney fees and costs on appeal, as provided by law.,If suit is filed for a deficiency judgment,
ate will be the same as the contract rate. If suit is filed for a judgment, Weber Counly Is the proper venue.
Sale, if you sell or transfer an interest in the property covered by the Security Instrument, we may terminate this Agreement and accelerate the
se of your Account, which means that all amounts owing to us shall become due and payable.
You agree to pay when due "all federal, state or local taxes and other charges on the Collateral securing this Agreement. If you fail to do so, we
quired taxes and add all expenses to your Account payable on demand at the interest rate then In effect,
of Terms. The terms of this Agreement may only be modified through the signing of a Change In Terms Agreement by all parties associated •
menl.
-oss, You will be bound by this Agreement even if the Collateral is damaged or destroyed,
jction. The interest you pay on this loan may or may not be tax deductible. You agree to consult with the Internal Revenue Service or a tax
mine v/hat portion of the Interest paid on "the loan may be tax deductible.
leous. Our rules for stopping payment on ordinary checks will.apply to slopping payments on Home Equity Line checks Including the charge
ml fee. You will immediately notify us of any changes In your address. Upon our request, you will provide us with a financial or credit statement
iclory to us , A waiver of any terms or conditions in this Agreement by us Is not a waiver of the same or of any other term or condition on any
If any part of this Agreement is invalid,, it shall hot make any other provision of this Agreement invalid. You will immediately notify us in writing
>me Equity Line checks and VISA cards are lost or.stolenor if.an unauthorized person uses your Account. Notices will be sent to us al the address
alest billing statement, to be effective upon receipt. Notices to you will be sent to your address as indicated on your lasl billing statement, to be
nailed unless differently stated in the notice. If more than one person is bound to the terms of the agreement, a notice to any onB of you will be
f you except for notices that affect the right of rescission, which will be sent to each person affected.
greement. The undersigned have entered into a credit agreement with the credit union, The written agreement Is a final expression of the agreeie undersigned and the credit uniqn.jTThls written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any oral agreement or alleged oral agreement.
j acknowledge receiving a copy of this Notice and agree that the written credit agreement contains the terms applicable to the credit transaction.
^OWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE ABOVE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.

Borrowers'.

A A 7 ' !

_ _
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^Gretfif Uriion'Authorized Representative

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_ '

t

KAKWiL NUMBER

09-32-316-024-eCTOOO

^

5,143633

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
AMERICA FIRST ORED/T UNION
P.O. Box 91B0

Ogden, Ulah B4409

23* OCTOBER ?1

11/42 AN

KATIE

DIXON

L-

RECORDERS SALT LAKE CQUHTYi UTAH
FIRST MERIMN TJTLE
REC BV- REBECCA G/W
; DEPUTY

HOME EQU/TY LINE
TRUST DEED
S DEED OF TRUST CONTAINS A DUE-ON-SALE PROVISION AND SECURES INDEBTEDNESS UNDER A CREDIT
C E M E N T WHICH PROVIDES FOR A REVOLVING LINE OF CREDIT AND A VARIABLE RATE OF INTEREST.
3 TRUST DEED, made [his .

22nd

riaynf

OCTOBER

; 1g

91

between

ELIZABETH D JOLLEY aka ELIZABETH D JOLLEY GARDNER and
JOHN D HOSGAN, a m a r r i e d man, a s j o i n t t e n a n t s

;as

T R U S T O R , whose address is

687 EAST 3RD AVENUE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103
(SUtvlofldHumbol)

(SlBlO)

(City)

TINOTHY \j BLACKBURN, a t t o r n e y a t l a w

as TRUSTEE, and

ICA FIRST CREDIT UNION a Uiah Corporation, as BENEFICIARY,
viESSETH; Thai Truslor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, Ihe

g described property, situated In

su

/

. SALT LAXF

County, Stale of Utah:

COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 1, BLOCK 5 3 , PLAT M D \
SALT LAKE CITY, SURVEY,' AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 41'.5 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 7 RODS; THENCE EAST 4 1 . 5 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 7 RODS TO THE
PLACE OF BEGINNING.

eslalo, fighl, HDe and Interest, Including Instance, which Trustor now has or may hereafter ocgulre, ellho/ In lav/ or In equity In and ID said premises; lo
same, togelhe/ wilh Ihe buildings and Improvements |he»eon and all alterations, additions or imp/overnenls now or hereafter made thereto, Including all
s and fixluies now or hereafter Installed or placed In said buildings or on said real proporly /or the generation or distribution ol atr, v/ator, heal, elednclty,
Ion or for ventilating or atr conditioning purposes, or lor sanitary oi drainage purposes, and including slovos, ranges, cabinets, awnings, window sbados,
iry rods and brackets, screen*, floor coverings.{inoludjnp. oil rugs Bind carpets ailaohod lo floors) and ell other similar Items and things; alt of Ihe llcrns
d and a/1 other simitar Items or fhlnos, whether now or hereafter placed on Iho property, being hereby declared lo be, ono* In all drcumsfanc as, shall be
id In connection with the purposes and powers ol Ihe.Trust Deed, things affixed lo ond a pari o! the really described herein,' fhe speclllc enumerations
e general, and together with alt sfngular lands, tenements, heiedilamenls, reverslonfs), romainder(s), privileges, v/aler rights and Appurtenances ol every
nlo belonging or in any way appertaining lo. or which may be hereafter acquired and used or enjoyed w/th, said property, or any part thereof,
E OF SECURING (1) payment 0/ all obJJgatfions now or be/caller pursuant lo or otherwise related or connected lo lhal certain 'Home Equity Line
Disclosure Statement* 0/ evan dale herewith executed by Ihe Trustor} Ihe ^Agreement*), which Agreement Evidences a revolving credli line In Ihe
ol.

TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND MO CENTS

>0.00**

••

• — - - - ^

_) together wfth Interest, costs, and expenses, as therein provided, payable lo Ihe o/der 0/ Beneficiary at the time, and in the
si as therein set lorth, lopejher with any extensions, renewals, modifications, and lulure advances Ihe/eo/ or thereunder; (2) the por/ormanco 0/
lor ho/ein contained; (3) the payment of all sums oxpBnded or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant lo Ihe terms of this Trust Deed and/or
r with Interest thereon as provided therein.
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ARGUMENT
The trial court in this case incorrectly granted Lowry and Kinsella's motion for
summary judgment.
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE J&T
PRESENTED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO RAISE GENUINE ISSUES OF
FACT.
The trial court incorrectly found that there were no issues of material fact as to

Plaintiff/Appellant Jones & Trevor Marketing ("J&T")'s claims against
Defendants/Appellees Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella ("Lowry and Kinsella").
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary judgment unless
the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
[2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c).
Despite Lowry and Kinsella's assertions to the contrary, the nonmoving party is
not required to "prove" its case in order to defeat the motion but rather must simply
present evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. Kimball
Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Again, the court's function in
assessing a motion for summary judgment is not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide
which side has the stronger case. Rather, the court's "sole inquiry should be whether
material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. Est. of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100
(Utah 1995).
J&T met its burden of raising genuine issues of material fact, and summary

1
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judgment was therefore in appropriate. Further, J&T presented evidence sufficient to
establish a prima facie case for its theory of alter ego, as well as for each of the
intentional torts asserted against Lowry and Kinsella. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 11-23.
Finally, it should be noted that fraud claims are generally not suitable for
disposition via summary judgment. Utah courts have repeatedly held that fraud claims
are generally considered heavily fact-specific and therefore "unsuited for summary
judgment." See, e.g., Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, P44, 156 P.3d
806; Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Reott, 2007 UT App 223, f 33, 163 P.3d 713. Much
of J&T's case against Lowry and Kinsella rests on fraud claims, including alter ego,
constructive fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure, and fraudulent misrepresentation. (R. 10211044.) And, as is typical of such claims, they are heavily fact-specific. J&T should have
the opportunity to present the evidence of such claims to a fact-finder, rather than to have
them disposed of in a summary judgment.
On appeal, this Court "views the evidence and all reasonable inferences thereon in
the light most favorable to the appellant" - in this case, J&T. Kleinert, 854 P.2d at 1026.
In addition, this Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Poteet
v. White, 2006 UT 63, \1, Ul P.3d 439. J&T therefore respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's decision because J&T presented evidence sufficient to raise
genuine issues of fact with regard to both its alter ego theory and its intentional tort
claims.

2
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A.

J&T Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise Genuine Issues Of Fact
With Respect To Its Alter Ego Theory,

The trial court incorrectly granted Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary
judgment on J&T's alter ego theory.
J&T presented evidence on a number of the unity of interest factors, sufficient to
withstand Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. As has been stated, Utah
courts use the following factors to determine whether there is a unity of interest between
individuals and a corporation:
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe
corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends; (4) siphoning of
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) non-functioning of other
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or
fraud.
Colman v. Colrnan, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Again, it should be noted
that the above factors are not conclusive or exclusive and not all factors need to be
present in order to find a unity of interest. See, e.g., id.
J&T presented evidence on several of the factors to show that there was a unity of
interest between Lowry and Kinsella and their two entities, Financial Development
Services, Inc. and Esbex.com, Inc.1
First, J&T presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella's entities were

1

J&T is not sure what specific references to the record Lowry and Kinsella believe do not
correspond with J&T's arguments. J&T sought to site to the record as accurately as
possible, relying on the Judgment Roll and Index prepared by the lower court.

3
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undercapitalized. In addition to the fact that both entities became insolvent in a relatively
short amount of time, there is evidence that the entities had insufficient funds to meet
their obligations - because of the actions of Lowry and Kinsella. J&T presented evidence
that Lowry and Kinsella took money from FDS and Esbex to fund their personal interests,
in disregard of the money needed to satisfy customers and to run the corporations. (R.
1300-03, 1642-46.) In addition, there is evidence that Lowry and Kinsella knew that they
were taking money earmarked for J&T customer refunds. (R. 1301, 1643-44.) This
evidence shows that the entities were likely undercapitalized.
Second, J&T presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella failed to observe
corporate formalities. There is evidence that Lowry and Kinsella took thousands of
dollars of company proceeds for personal use, such as hunting trips, without proper
documentation or accounting. (R. 1301, 1643.) In addition, Lowry and Kinsella
presented no evidence that they did properly account for such items, or that there was
appropriate payment and accounting of dividends.
Third, J&T presented evidence of siphoning of funds by dominant stockholders.
As mentioned above, there is evidence that Lowry and Kinsella took thousands of dollars
of company proceeds for personal use, such as hunting trips, without proper
documentation or accounting. (R. 1301, 1643.) Further evidence showed that Lowry and
Kinsella took money from FDS and Esbex to fund their personal interests, in disregard of
the money needed to run the corporations. (R. 1300-03, 1642-46.) Finally, there is also
evidence that Kinsella took money from FSD without telling Lowry. (R. 1302, 1644-45.)

4
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Finally, J&T presented evidence that the corporate entities were used by Lowry
and Kinsella to promote fraud or injustice against J&T. When customers returned J&T
products, Lowry and Kinsella kept the refund from J&T and, instead of sending the
product back to J&T, resold the product to new customers. (R. 1300, 1303-04, 1642.)
J&T submitted evidence that Lowry and Kinsella knew that they were taking money
earmarked for J&T customer refunds, (R. 1301, 1643-44.) and that after FDS terminated
the agreement with J&T, Lowry and Kinsella made the decision to continue selling
coaching, to instruct their employees not tell J&T about it, and to keep the money derived
from the sales. (R. 1300, 1302, 1641-42.)
J&T presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the unity of interest prong of the alter ego theory was met. In addition, J&T submitted
evidence, not considered by the trial court, that the observation of the corporate forms
would sanction fraud, and an unjust, inequitable result would follow.
In this case, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that allowing Lowry and
Kinsella to hide behind the corporate shield would result in an injustice to J&T.
Observing the corporate form in this case would sanction the fraud committed by both
Lowry and Kinsella. Both FDS and Esbex were clearly undercapitalized, as demonstrated
by the short life spans of the two entities, the admission that the two entities were
insolvent, and Lowry and Kinsella's penchant for taking money from the corporation
without first satisfying the corporations'financial obligations. (R. 1640-59.) Further,
since FDS and Esbex were dissolved several years ago, Plaintiff has no other recourse for

5
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the wrongs he suffered as a result of the actions of Lowry and Kinsella. In any event,
there was sufficient evidence of potential injustice, combined with the above failure to
observe corporate formalities, to prevent the court from granting Lowry and Kinsella's
motion for summary judgment.
B.

J&T Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise Genuine Issues Of Fact
With Respect To Its Intentional Tort Claims Against Lowry And
Kinsella.

The trial court incorrectly held that no personal liability could attach to Lowry and
Kinsella for the torts they allegedly committed. The Utah Supreme Court has noted with
regard to fraud: "a director or officer of a corporation is individually liable for fraudulent
acts or false representations of his own or in which he participates, even though his action
in such respect may be in furtherance of the corporate business." Armed Forces Ins.
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 19, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and
Deceit § 322 (1968)). Thus, though Lowry and Kinsella may have been acting in
furtherance of their entities, they can still be held personally liable for torts in which they
participated.
J&T presented evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact as to whether
Lowry and Kinsella personally committed the following torts in connection with the J&T
contract: theft by conversion, constructive fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure, intentional
interference with business relations, and fraudulent misrepresentation.
1.

Theft by Conversion

J&T presented evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment with respect to

6
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its theft by conversion claim against Lowry and Kinsella. In its initial brief, J&T set forth
the elements of a theft by conversion claim and restated the evidence in support of its
claim. One point of clarification should be added. The issue of whether J&T had an
immediate right to payments for coaching and to its customer lists and leads is a question
of contract interpretation. Lowry and Kinsella assert that they believed coaching was not
covered by the contract. (R. 1644.) J&T asserts that coaching was covered. (R. 1318.)
Also, there is an issue of fact as to whether Lowry's July 2002 letter terminated the
contract and whether that contract gave J&T the immediate right to possession of its
customer lists and leads. In light of these issues of fact and law, summary judgment on
J&T's theft by conversion claim was inappropriate.
2.

Constructive Fraud/Fraudulent Nondisclosure

J&T presented evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment with respect to
its constructive fraud and fraudulent nondisclosure claims against Lowry and Kinsella. In
its initial brief, J&T set forth the elements of its constructive fraud claim and its
fraudulent nondisclosure claim and restated the evidence in support of those claims.
For the constructive fraud claim, Lowry and Kinsella had a confidential
relationship with J&T. In Kuhre v. Goodfellow, the court defined a "confidential
relationship":
A confidential relationship arises when one party, having gained the trust and
confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over the other party.
This doctrine rests upon the principle of inequality between the parties.
2003 UT App 85, f 18, 69 P.3d 286 (internal citations omitted); see also Gold Standard,
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Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996).
In a case remarkably on point, the court in Strickland v. Arnold Thomas Seed
Service, Inc., 560 P.2d 597 (Ore. 1977), found that the defendant agent owed the plaintiff
a fiduciary duty. In Strickland, the plaintiff (an alfalfa seed farmer) and the defendant (a
seed broker) entered into a written contract whereby the broker sold plaintiffs seed in a
pool of other alfalfa farmers. Id. at 598. The agreement provided that the broker had the
right to possession and control of the seed, and the sole right to determine the times and
prices at which the seed would be sold. Further, the broker agreed to use its best efforts
in marketing the plaintiffs seed. Id. at 599-600. Based on this, the Strickland court
found a duty flowing from the broker to the plaintiff:
The marketing agreement gave [the broker] control over the pool members'
seed, including the sole power to determine the price, dates, and terms of sales.
The pool members had no control over any marketing decisions and, indeed,
were not kept informed of those decisions. The pool members surrendered to
[the broker] complete control over their crops, and were entitled to expect that
[the broker] would exercise that control according to the highest standards
applicable to a fiduciary.
Id. at 600. In the present case, J&T gave control to Lowry and Kinsella over its customer
names and contact information. (R. 1029-1044.) Also, Lowry and Kinsella had the sole
power to determine the price, dates and terms of sale. Id. Further, J&T had no control
over any marketing decisions and indeed was not kept informed of those decisions. Id.
And J&T was therefore entitled to expect that Lowry and Kinsella would exercise control
over J&T's products, lists, and reputation according to the highest standards applicable to
a fiduciary.

8
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Accordingly, a confidential relationship existed between the parties. And, as a
result of this confidential relationship, Lowry and Kinsella had a legal duty to
communicate with J&T, which is an element of J&T's fraudulent nondisclosure claim.
Because a confidential relationship existed between the parties, or at least there was a
genuine issue of fact as to whether a confidential relationship existed between the parties,
summary judgment on J&T's constructive fraud and fraudulent nondisclosure claims was
inappropriate.
3.

Intentional Interference with Business Relations

J&T presented evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment with respect to
its intentional interference with business relations claim against Lowry and Kinsella. In
its initial brief, J&T set forth the elements of its intentional interference with business
relations claim and restated the evidence in support of its claim. One fact in addition to
those set forth in the opening brief should be highlighted.
J&T presented evidence that, after Mr. Lowry sent the termination letter on July
19, 2002, Lowry and Kinsella continued to sell J&T's products and use J&T's leads. (R.
1323-1567.) Specifically, Lowry and Kinsella contacted several of J&T clients several
months after the July 2002 termination letter, and Lowry and Kinsella used J&T's names
and customers as testimonials on Exbex.com. Id. This continued use of J&T's
proprietary information was principally calculated to both benefit Lowry and Kinsella and
damage J&T's reputation and future business interests. In light of the issues of fact raised
by J&T, summary judgment on this claim was improper.

9
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4.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

J&T presented evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment with respect to
its fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Lowry and Kinsella. In its initial brief,
J&T set forth the elements of its fraudulent misrepresentation claim and restated the
evidence in support of its claim.
Specifically, J&T presented evidence that Lowry represented that FDS canceled its
contract with J&T and that FDS was ceasing to sell J&T's products as of July 19, 2002.
(R. 2342-2343.) The contract provides that upon termination, FDS is to "immediately
cease: (i) any contact with Jones' leads; (ii) selling Jones' products; (iii) in any way
representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones products; and (iv) the use of Jones'
trademarks service marks or other Confidential Information." (R. 2348-2349.)
J&T presented evidence, that at the time the representation was made on July 19,
2002 that the contract was terminated, neither Lowry nor Kinsella intended to keep the
contract provisions just then brought into play by the termination. J&T presented
evidence that, after the termination letter was sent on July 19, 2002, Lowry and Kinsella
did in fact continue to sell J&T's products and use J&T's leads. (R. 1323-1567.)
Specifically, Lowry and Kinsella contacted several of J&T clients several months after
the July 2002 termination letter, and Lowry and Kinsella used J&T's names and
customers as testimonials on Exbex.com. Id.
In sum, J&T presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella personally committed
fraud and other torts with respect to the contract with J&T. Such evidence was sufficient

10
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to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lowry and Kinsella should be
held personally liable for the torts in which they participated.
II.

THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT PROVIDE THIS COURT
WITH AN INDEPENDENT BASIS ON WHICH TO AFFIRM THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULINGS.
The economic loss rule does not prohibit J&T's recovery in this case. Lowry and

Kinsella's recitation of the case law on the economic loss rule is generally correct.
However, their definition of the rule left out an essential element. The economic loss rule
means that "one may not recover 'economic' losses under a theory of non-intentional
tort:9 Am. Towers Assoc, Inc. v. CCIMeek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996)
(emphasis added). "In other words, economic damages are not recoverable in negligence
...."Id.
In this case, the only torts pleaded by J&T against Lowry and Kinsella were
intentional torts: theft by conversion, constructive fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure,
intentional interference with contractual relations, and fraudulent misrepresentation. (R.
1021-1044.) J&T asserted no negligence claims against Lowry and Kinsella. Id. Thus,
the economic loss rule does not apply to this case and does not give this Court an
independent basis on which to affirm the trial court's rulings.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant
of partial summary judgment in Lowry and Kinsella's favor and remand this case back to
the trial court for trial on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of August 2009.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

/s/ Jessica Griffin Anderson
Stephen Quesenberry
Jessica Griffin Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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